Showing posts with label facebook. Show all posts
Showing posts with label facebook. Show all posts

Thursday, August 20, 2020

The Suitors Cometh: Children's Health Defense v. Facebook - Removing The Iron Curtain Of The Child Welfare Industry

This is not about censorship.

This is about Public Private Partnerships and the generation of propaganda.

I see FCPA.

Then, the case is about the process of discovery, because, in discovery, we shall find the original source of all the funding, what they do with the funding, and who came up with the statements and challenges to the statements.

Here, Robert Kennedy, Jr. argues on behalf of the Children's Health Defense.

#maytheheavensfall



Children's Health Defense Legal Team Led by Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. Sues Facebook, "Fact-Checkers", Zuckerberg for Government-Sponsored Censorship, False Disparagement and Wire-Fraud


WASHINGTON, Aug. 18, 2020 /PRNewswire/ -- Children's Health Defense (CHD) filed a lawsuit on Monday in San Francisco Federal Court charging Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, and three fact-checking companies with censoring truthful public health posts and fraudulently misrepresenting and defaming CHD. CHD, a non-profit watchdog group exposing wrongdoing and corruption in pharmaceutical and Telecom companies and public health agencies including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO), has also sued the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for wireless health concerns.

Register for Online press conference with legal team and key witness: Wed., 8.19.20, 3:00 p.m. ET

In its Complaint, CHD alleges that Facebook has insidious conflicts with Pharmaceutical companies and their captive health regulators, and is invested in telecom and 5G. Facebook currently censors CHD's page, targeting its purge against factual information about vaccines and 5G.

Facebook acknowledges censorship coordination with WHO and CDC. While earlier court decisions have upheld Facebook's right to censor content, CHD argues that Facebook's pervasive Government collaboration makes its censorship a First Amendment violation. Facebook censorship began at the urging of Congressman Adam Schiff, who in March 2019 suggested Facebook suppress and purge content critical of government vaccine policies.

The lawsuit also challenges Facebook's use of so-called "independent fact-checkers"—who are neither independent nor fact-based—to create oppositional content on CHD's page, literally superimposed over CHD's original content. To further silence CHD's dissent against government policies and critique of Pharma, Facebook deactivated CHD's donate button and used deceptive technology (i.e. shadow banning) to minimize CHD's reach and visibility. In short, Facebook and the government colluded to silence CHD and its followers. Such tactics are fundamentally at odds with the First Amendment, which forbids Government from censoring private speech—particularly speech that criticizes Government policies or officials.

The court will decide whether Facebook's new Government-directed business model of false and misleading "warning labels," deceptive "fact-checks," and disabling a non-profit's donate button passes muster under the First and Fifth Amendments, the Lanham Act, and RICO. Those statutes protect CHD against online wire-fraud and false disparagement.

Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.: "This is an important First Amendment case testing the boundaries of government authority to openly censor unwanted critiques of government policies and pharmaceutical and telecom products on privately owned internet platforms."

MEDIA CONTACT: Mary Holland 845-445-7807

Voting is beautiful, be beautiful ~ vote.©

Monday, August 3, 2020

Bearing False Witness In The U.S. House Judiciary Committee - Facebook Banned Me For The 2020 Primary Elections

Facebook got mad and banned me for three days, the day before the 2020 Primary Election, which is highly contentious in legitimacy, considering the fact that Facebook recently testified in U.S. House Judiciary Committee that they do not suppress, shadowbanned, ban, silence, cover up, conservative accounts...yet, will bleachbit the history of my Sweetie and anything dealing with child welfare, voting rights, and anything to do with property (i.e. intellectual, real estate, land, chattel).

According to the Associated Press, Pope Benedict is not healthy.

Report: Retired Pope Benedict XVI ill after visit to Germany

But, then, a few hours later, there appears a singular post on the wonderful health of Pope Benedict.

According to Catholic News Agency, Pope Benedict is healthy.

Vatican: Benedict XVI health 'not serious' concern

Of course, I am the only one to be silenced, where I cannot even log in, to document the activities of the August 4th, 2020 Primary Election in Detroit.

Celebration for all!

Unfortunately, I still have a blog, of which, I do expect to magically disappear because Google, Facebook & Yahoo also testified in U.S. House Judiciary Committee, under oath, testifying that they do not bleachbit history.

Whatever you do, do not tell them that I have all the data to demonstrate that they were lying, bearing false witness in the public record, while engaging in commerce, generating profit, from a foreign nation, which, the last time I checked, interfered in U.S. elections, but, hey, what do I know?

I know I entered all my social media accounts into the formal record, including a court of law, so do not tell them it is all public information, just like the Mueller sealed Grand Jury information, everyone seems to be so desperate to get their hands on.

Just ask the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops.

https://beverlytran.blogspot.com/search/label/facebook

https://beverlytran.blogspot.com/search/label/twitter

https://beverlytran.blogspot.com/search/label/google

I shall enjoy the show.

#maytheheavensfall



Voting is beautiful, be beautiful ~ vote.©

Thursday, May 28, 2020

Tales Of The New Crown: Executive Order On Social Media - When Does Free Speech Become Paid Speech?

Free speech means it is free.

When there is money involved, it is not free.

Sometimes, when money is involved in online speech, under the guise of free speech, there are some individuals, such as myself, who would consider this wire fraud, because it crosses state lines in an act of commerce, like Patreon or Superchats.

There are even those special occasions where some forms of speech in an act of engaging in commerce, for the purposes of political activities, is called propaganda.



Twitter Fact Check Of Trump On Absentee Ballots Is A Blatant Farce To Cover Up Gerrymandering

#maytheheavensfall

Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship
 INFRASTRUCTURE & TECHNOLOGY

  Issued on: May 28, 2020

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1.  Policy.  Free speech is the bedrock of American democracy.  Our Founding Fathers protected this sacred right with the First Amendment to the Constitution.  The freedom to express and debate ideas is the foundation for all of our rights as a free people.

In a country that has long cherished the freedom of expression, we cannot allow a limited number of online platforms to hand pick the speech that Americans may access and convey on the internet.  This practice is fundamentally un-American and anti-democratic.  When large, powerful social media companies censor opinions with which they disagree, they exercise a dangerous power.  They cease functioning as passive bulletin boards, and ought to be viewed and treated as content creators.

The growth of online platforms in recent years raises important questions about applying the ideals of the First Amendment to modern communications technology.  Today, many Americans follow the news, stay in touch with friends and family, and share their views on current events through social media and other online platforms.  As a result, these platforms function in many ways as a 21st century equivalent of the public square.

Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube wield immense, if not unprecedented, power to shape the interpretation of public events; to censor, delete, or disappear information; and to control what people see or do not see.

As President, I have made clear my commitment to free and open debate on the internet. Such debate is just as important online as it is in our universities, our town halls, and our homes.  It is essential to sustaining our democracy.

Online platforms are engaging in selective censorship that is harming our national discourse.  Tens of thousands of Americans have reported, among other troubling behaviors, online platforms “flagging” content as inappropriate, even though it does not violate any stated terms of service; making unannounced and unexplained changes to company policies that have the effect of disfavoring certain viewpoints; and deleting content and entire accounts with no warning, no rationale, and no recourse.

Twitter now selectively decides to place a warning label on certain tweets in a manner that clearly reflects political bias.  As has been reported, Twitter seems never to have placed such a label on another politician’s tweet.  As recently as last week, Representative Adam Schiff was continuing to mislead his followers by peddling the long-disproved Russian Collusion Hoax, and Twitter did not flag those tweets.  Unsurprisingly, its officer in charge of so-called ‘Site Integrity’ has flaunted his political bias in his own tweets.

At the same time online platforms are invoking inconsistent, irrational, and groundless justifications to censor or otherwise restrict Americans’ speech here at home, several online platforms are profiting from and promoting the aggression and disinformation spread by foreign governments like China.  One United States company, for example, created a search engine for the Chinese Communist Party that would have blacklisted searches for “human rights,” hid data unfavorable to the Chinese Communist Party, and tracked users determined appropriate for surveillance.  It also established research partnerships in China that provide direct benefits to the Chinese military.  Other companies have accepted advertisements paid for by the Chinese government that spread false information about China’s mass imprisonment of religious minorities, thereby enabling these abuses of human rights.  They have also amplified China’s propaganda abroad, including by allowing Chinese government officials to use their platforms to spread misinformation regarding the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, and to undermine pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong.

As a Nation, we must foster and protect diverse viewpoints in today’s digital communications environment where all Americans can and should have a voice.  We must seek transparency and accountability from online platforms, and encourage standards and tools to protect and preserve the integrity and openness of American discourse and freedom of expression.

Sec. 2.  Protections Against Online Censorship.  (a)  It is the policy of the United States to foster clear ground rules promoting free and open debate on the internet.  Prominent among the ground rules governing that debate is the immunity from liability created by section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act (section 230(c)).  47 U.S.C. 230(c).  It is the policy of the United States that the scope of that immunity should be clarified: the immunity should not extend beyond its text and purpose to provide protection for those who purport to provide users a forum for free and open speech, but in reality use their power over a vital means of communication to engage in deceptive or pretextual actions stifling free and open debate by censoring certain viewpoints.

Section 230(c) was designed to address early court decisions holding that, if an online platform restricted access to some content posted by others, it would thereby become a “publisher” of all the content posted on its site for purposes of torts such as defamation.  As the title of section 230(c) makes clear, the provision provides limited liability “protection” to a provider of an interactive computer service (such as an online platform) that engages in “‘Good Samaritan’ blocking” of harmful content.  In particular, the Congress sought to provide protections for online platforms that attempted to protect minors from harmful content and intended to ensure that such providers would not be discouraged from taking down harmful material.  The provision was also intended to further the express vision of the Congress that the internet is a “forum for a true diversity of political discourse.”  47 U.S.C. 230(a)(3).  The limited protections provided by the statute should be construed with these purposes in mind.

In particular, subparagraph (c)(2) expressly addresses protections from “civil liability” and specifies that an interactive computer service provider may not be made liable “on account of” its decision in “good faith” to restrict access to content that it considers to be “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or otherwise objectionable.”  It is the policy of the United States to ensure that, to the maximum extent permissible under the law, this provision is not distorted to provide liability protection for online platforms that — far from acting in “good faith” to remove objectionable content — instead engage in deceptive or pretextual actions (often contrary to their stated terms of service) to stifle viewpoints with which they disagree.  Section 230 was not intended to allow a handful of companies to grow into titans controlling vital avenues for our national discourse under the guise of promoting open forums for debate, and then to provide those behemoths blanket immunity when they use their power to censor content and silence viewpoints that they dislike.  When an interactive computer service provider removes or restricts access to content and its actions do not meet the criteria of subparagraph (c)(2)(A), it is engaged in editorial conduct.  It is the policy of the United States that such a provider should properly lose the limited liability shield of subparagraph (c)(2)(A) and be exposed to liability like any traditional editor and publisher that is not an online provider.

(b)  To advance the policy described in subsection (a) of this section, all executive departments and agencies should ensure that their application of section 230(c) properly reflects the narrow purpose of the section and take all appropriate actions in this regard.  In addition, within 60 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), in consultation with the Attorney General, and acting through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), shall file a petition for rulemaking with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) requesting that the FCC expeditiously propose regulations to clarify:

(i) the interaction between subparagraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of section 230, in particular to clarify and determine the circumstances under which a provider of an interactive computer service that restricts access to content in a manner not specifically protected by subparagraph (c)(2)(A) may also not be able to claim protection under subparagraph (c)(1), which merely states that a provider shall not be treated as a publisher or speaker for making third-party content available and does not address the provider’s responsibility for its own editorial decisions;

(ii)  the conditions under which an action restricting access to or availability of material is not “taken in good faith” within the meaning of subparagraph (c)(2)(A) of section 230, particularly whether actions can be “taken in good faith” if they are:

(A)  deceptive, pretextual, or inconsistent with a provider’s terms of service; or

(B)  taken after failing to provide adequate notice, reasoned explanation, or a meaningful opportunity to be heard; and

(iii)  any other proposed regulations that the NTIA concludes may be appropriate to advance the policy described in subsection (a) of this section.

Sec. 3.  Protecting Federal Taxpayer Dollars from Financing Online Platforms That Restrict Free Speech.  (a)  The head of each executive department and agency (agency) shall review its agency’s Federal spending on advertising and marketing paid to online platforms.  Such review shall include the amount of money spent, the online platforms that receive Federal dollars, and the statutory authorities available to restrict their receipt of advertising dollars.

(b)  Within 30 days of the date of this order, the head of each agency shall report its findings to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

(c)  The Department of Justice shall review the viewpoint-based speech restrictions imposed by each online platform identified in the report described in subsection (b) of this section and assess whether any online platforms are problematic vehicles for government speech due to viewpoint discrimination, deception to consumers, or other bad practices.

Sec. 4.  Federal Review of Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices.  (a)  It is the policy of the United States that large online platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, as the critical means of promoting the free flow of speech and ideas today, should not restrict protected speech.  The Supreme Court has noted that social media sites, as the modern public square, “can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard.”  Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).  Communication through these channels has become important for meaningful participation in American democracy, including to petition elected leaders.  These sites are providing an important forum to the public for others to engage in free expression and debate.  Cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85-89 (1980).

(b)  In May of 2019, the White House launched a Tech Bias Reporting tool to allow Americans to report incidents of online censorship.  In just weeks, the White House received over 16,000 complaints of online platforms censoring or otherwise taking action against users based on their political viewpoints.  The White House will submit such complaints received to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).

(c)  The FTC shall consider taking action, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, pursuant to section 45 of title 15, United States Code.  Such unfair or deceptive acts or practice may include practices by entities covered by section 230 that restrict speech in ways that do not align with those entities’ public representations about those practices.

(d)  For large online platforms that are vast arenas for public debate, including the social media platform Twitter, the FTC shall also, consistent with its legal authority, consider whether complaints allege violations of law that implicate the policies set forth in section 4(a) of this order.  The FTC shall consider developing a report describing such complaints and making the report publicly available, consistent with applicable law.

Sec. 5.  State Review of Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices and Anti-Discrimination Laws.  (a)  The Attorney General shall establish a working group regarding the potential enforcement of State statutes that prohibit online platforms from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices.  The working group shall also develop model legislation for consideration by legislatures in States where existing statutes do not protect Americans from such unfair and deceptive acts and practices. The working group shall invite State Attorneys General for discussion and consultation, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law.

(b) Complaints described in section 4(b) of this order will be shared with the working group, consistent with applicable law. The working group shall also collect publicly available information regarding the following:

(i) increased scrutiny of users based on the other users they choose to follow, or their interactions with other users;

(ii) algorithms to suppress content or users based on indications of political alignment or viewpoint;

(iii) differential policies allowing for otherwise impermissible behavior, when committed by accounts associated with the Chinese Communist Party or other anti-democratic associations or governments;

(iv) reliance on third-party entities, including contractors, media organizations, and individuals, with indicia of bias to review content; and

(v) acts that limit the ability of users with particular viewpoints to earn money on the platform compared with other users similarly situated.

Sec. 6.  Legislation.  The Attorney General shall develop a proposal for Federal legislation that would be useful to promote the policy objectives of this order.

Sec. 7.  Definition.  For purposes of this order, the term “online platform” means any website or application that allows users to create and share content or engage in social networking, or any general search engine.

Sec. 8.  General Provisions. (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)    the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)   the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

Voting is beautiful, be beautiful ~ vote.©

Saturday, April 18, 2020

Anndrea Quaill Does Not Like Me

Meet Anndrea Quaill.

She does not like me.

She likes #pizzagate.

She likes prolife.

She like Q.

She likes Timonthy Holmseth.

She likes Antony Fauci.

She is christian.

She likes to rally posses with guns in hand to take over local governments.

She likes to not like people who do not look or act like she does, so, I thought it only wise to put her in the annals of history.

https://www.facebook.com/groups/371941663159793/1146105012410117/?comment_id=1146141272406491&notif_id=1587257580638406&notif_t=group_comment


Voting is beautiful, be beautiful ~ vote.©

Friday, January 10, 2020

DOJ and FTC Announce Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines for Public Comment - Antitrust

You may find the history behind anttitrust, here.



The Department of Justice today withdrew the 1984 DOJ Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and, together with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), released new draft 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines (draft guidelines) and seek public comment. The draft guidelines, open to comment for 30 days, describe how the federal antitrust agencies review vertical mergers to evaluate whether the mergers violate antitrust law. Vertical mergers combine two or more companies that operate at different levels in the same supply chainThe draft guidelines outline the agencies’ principal analytical techniques, practices, and enforcement policy for vertical mergers.
The agencies will review and consider the public comments before issuing final Vertical Merger Guidelines. The agencies cooperated closely in preparing the draft guidelines, which reflect the agencies’ significant experience in analyzing vertical mergers. The guidelines are intended to assist the business community and antitrust practitioners by providing transparency about the agencies’ antitrust enforcement policy with respect to vertical mergers.
“I appreciate the Antitrust Division working to update this decades-old statement regarding the practices and policies of the federal enforcement agencies in this critical area, in coordination with the Federal Trade Commission,” said Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey A. Rosen. “As this effort demonstrates, the Department of Justice is committed to principled and transparent antitrust enforcement, which promotes free enterprise, market competition, and ultimately the welfare of American consumers. We look forward to public input and finalizing this important work, along with the FTC.”
“While many vertical mergers are competitively beneficial or neutral, both the Department and the Federal Trade Commission have recognized for over 25 years that some vertical transactions can raise serious concern,” said Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. “The revised draft guidelines are based on new economic understandings and the agencies’ experience over the past several decades and better reflect the agencies’ actual practice in evaluating proposed vertical mergers. Once finalized, the Vertical Merger Guidelines will provide more clarity and transparency on how we review vertical transactions. I look forward to receiving comments on these draft guidelines and working with the Federal Trade Commission in finalizing them.”
“Challenging anticompetitive vertical mergers is essential to vigorous enforcement. The agencies’ vertical merger policy has evolved substantially since the issuance of the 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and our guidelines should reflect the current enforcement approach. Greater transparency about the complex issues surrounding vertical mergers will benefit the business community, practitioners, and the courts,” said FTC Chairman Joseph J. Simons. “We invite comments from all stakeholders to help ensure that the guidelines clearly and accurately convey the agencies’ antitrust enforcement policy with respect to vertical mergers.”
The draft guidelines adopt the principles and analytical frameworks in the agencies’ Horizontal Merger Guidelines, including market definition, the analytic framework for evaluating entry considerations, the treatment of the acquisition of a failing firm or its assets, and the acquisition of a partial ownership interest. The draft guidelines describe the analytical and enforcement considerations that are specific to vertical mergers.
The draft guidelines:
  • describe potential anticompetitive effects resulting from vertical mergers, which may include both unilateral and coordinated effects;
  • identify foreclosure and raising rivals’ costs and access to competitively sensitive information as potential elements of antitrust harm under unilateral effects;
  • describe an analytic framework for analyzing potential anticompetitive effects of foreclosure and raising rivals’ costs;
  • discuss how the elimination of double marginalization may mitigate or completely neutralize the potential anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers;
  • discuss cognizable merger efficiencies that are specific to vertical mergers;
  • provide a number of examples to provide more clarity about the agencies’ analytical methods in evaluating vertical mergers.
Comments on the draft guidelines can be emailed to verticalmergerguidelines@ftc.gov and verticalmergerguidelines@usdoj.gov, and must be received no later than Feb. 11, 2020. 
The year 2020 marks the 150th anniversary of the Department of Justice.  Learn more about the history of our agency at www.Justice.gov/Celebrating150Years.

Voting is beautiful, be beautiful ~ vote.©

Thursday, December 12, 2019

DOJ: Bill Barr Addresses The National Association of Attorneys General 2019 Capital Forum - No Mention Of Medicaid Fraud In Child Welfare Or Parental Rights

Boo Boo Barr!

But, what about Medicaid Fraud in Child Welfare?

What about the States Attorneys General Medicaid Fraud Control Units?

How about addressing Parental Rights, and not just corporate parental rights of foreign corporations?

We need to talk...

Remember this?

Michigan Medicaid Fraud To Be Discussed In Appropriations


I was watching this youtuber who goes by the name of John Oloughlin who mentioned that you were Opus Dei.

I figured that the only way he knew this was because he was also Opus Dei.

He went to the Red Mass of the John Caroll Society of the Archdiocese of Washington.

My Sweetie never went to that Mass.

https://web.archive.org/web/20151214055757/http://www.johncarrollsociety.org/jcs-membership/the-red-mass/index.aspx

This is about the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops operating as a foreign corporation.

The Tale Of Burisma, Hunter Biden, Taggart Romney, Their Daddies, Deutsche Bank & Trafficking Tiny Human Trust Funds With Catholic Charities







The Cathedral of St. Nicholas is glorious in Kiev and seems to have a strong presence in Michigan.

https://opusdei.org/uk-ua/

I just thought I would share.

I like to share.

Would you like me to share some more stuff?

Very well.....stop stealin' the children, land & votes.





  • WashingtonDC
     ~
    Tuesday, December 10, 2019

    Remarks as Prepared for Delivery
    Good afternoon.  Thank you General Landry for that kind introduction, and thank you to the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) for inviting me to join you today.  It is an honor and privilege to be here with my fellow attorneys general.
    Through the Executive Working Group and in various operations, we are working together on several important law enforcement priorities.  Elder Justice is a personal priority for me, and I know the State AGs have been leading the charge for many years.  Derrick Schmidt’s Presidential initiative highlighted the impact of this important issue.  Each year, over three billion dollars are stolen or defrauded from millions of America’s elderly through a variety of malicious scams.  The State AGs are on the front line in this fight to protect the elderly from being exploited, and I pledge the Department’s full support in that effort.     
    Similarly, human trafficking is an extremely important law enforcement issue for both the DOJ and the States AGs.  Attorneys General Paxton, Healey, Bacerra, Reyes and many others have been leaders in this vital effort.  We worked together to take down backpage.com, and we continue to engage our state partners though our Human Trafficking Prosecutorial Unit.  We look forward to continuing that work with you to make more progress in the year ahead.  
    In addition to these important priorities, another topic that involves almost every AG in this room and one that also benefits from close federal-state cooperation is the review into market-leading online platforms. 
    I. Benefits of Broad State AG Support on Review of Market-Leading Online Platforms
    In DC, it’s hard to find many things that everyone agrees on.  One thing that has found wide and bi-partisan support, however, is the government taking a closer look at the leading online platforms and the competitiveness of digital markets.
    Online platforms play an important role in our economy and in Americans’ daily lives, often serving as gateways for how we access goods, services, information and even each other. 
    A few digital platforms in particular have enjoyed significant growth over the past decade.  Consumers now depend on these platforms every day.  Their size and pervasiveness have led to public concerns about the competitive health of these digital markets. 
    We’ve heard widespread concerns from consumers, businesses and entrepreneurs, including about stagnated innovation, high prices, lack of choice, privacy, transparency, and public safety.  In response, DOJ initiated a review into market-leading online platforms, which we announced publicly last July. 
    Concerns about online platforms have come from a wide variety of stakeholders, across the political spectrum.  Indeed, almost every State AG is now participating in publicly announced antitrust investigations of Google and Facebook.  I’ve had the benefit of meeting with representatives of these groups at the Department, and believe we have a good cooperative relationship in these efforts.
    This is not the first time that the Department of Justice has cooperated with a bi-partisan coalition of State AGs on an antitrust matter involving a digital platform.
    When the Department of Justice litigated a case against Microsoft roughly 20 years ago for antitrust violations, it was joined by a coalition of 20 state attorneys general and the District of Columbia.  There are still those in the Department and State AG community, including my friend Tom Miller, who were closely involved and remember it well.
    Today, the State AG coalitions investigating Google and Facebook are even bigger than in Microsoft, including almost every state and federal territory.  I think this demonstrates the importance of these issues to Americans across the country, regardless of location or political persuasion.
    II. Benefits of a Broad, Holistic Perspective
    The benefits of a broad approach to online platforms go beyond building a federal-state partnership.  A broader, holistic perspective is also important as we consider substantive issues raised by the digital economy, both within and outside of the arena of antitrust.
    Let me start with antitrust.  Antitrust is a core focus of the Department’s review into market-leading platforms because, ultimately, fair competition can cure many of the ills we see.  In a functioning free market, consumers can demand alternatives that better address their preferences, including for greater privacy, more transparency, or increased safety.  For consumer choice and the free market to work, however, firms have to be playing by the established rules of competition. That’s where antitrust enforcement steps in.
    Many online platforms are not only big, but also offer a wide breadth of products and services.  Antitrust enforcers therefore must take an equally broad view of these platforms’ offerings, and the relationships between different markets, products, and business practices.
    Let me touch on a few examples of where a broader perspective is useful in an antitrust analysis.
    First, a broader perspective requires understanding the characteristics of the market.  This includes looking at whether there are high barriers to entry that prevent or deter new competitors.  For example, digital platform markets are often characterized by economies of scale and scope, including direct and indirect network effects. 
    Take, for example, direct network effects in social media.  The more users on the same social media platform, the more valuable that platform is overall.  There are benefits to consumers from being on the same network as their friends and family.  At the same time, the existence of such network effects can make it harder for a new platform to attract users.  
    This positive feedback loop is also inherent in platforms that rely on data and machine-learning.  For example, generally speaking, the more data a search engine has, the better its algorithms for search results can be.  The better the algorithm, the more users it can attract, and with them comes even more data.  And the cycle starts anew. 
    Digital platforms can also have indirect network effects, meaning the more users on one side of the platform increases the value to users on the other side of the platform. 
    In Microsoft, for example, there were indirect network effects that created what the court described as an “applications barrier to entry.”  The more consumers that used the Microsoft operating system, the more attractive the platform was to application developers.  Conversely, the more applications that were on the Microsoft operating system, the more attractive the platform was for users.  These indirect network effects created a barrier to entry that helped protect Microsoft’s monopoly. 
    Network effects are not inherently problematic.  However, where strong network effects create a significant barrier to entry, it can lead to increased market power, which in turn can be used in anticompetitive ways.  
    Given these dynamics, antitrust enforcers must be particularly vigilant to police for agreements and conduct that harm the competitive process.
    Similarly, market power is not itself wrongful.  As I’ve said before, big is not necessarily bad.  Healthy competition creates winners and losers, and the prospect of winning (and the profits that come with it) can drive innovation in the first place.  Success that comes from creating a better, more innovative product should be applauded.  The danger, however, is that a monopolist (even one who earned that status lawfully) can be tempted to use their power to engage in anticompetitive conduct to preserve their dominant position. 
    Moreover, the existence of market power can change the competitive effects of a business practice.  Conduct that may be procompetitive for a new entrant can become anticompetitive if undertaken by the incumbent 800 pound gorilla.  
    For example, exclusivity agreements by a new entrant can increase competition by enabling a competitor to attract users with unique offerings, even in markets with strong network effects.  At the same time, exclusive dealing by a monopolist could have the opposite effect by depriving rivals of the inputs or scale necessary to compete. 
    Bundling, tying, predatory pricing, and certain refusals to deal are other examples of conduct that can become problematic when undertaken by a firm with market or monopoly power. 
    As digital firms transition from being the disruptive new entrant into an established market leader, they should pay attention to the impact of their business practices.  So too should the antitrust enforcers.
    Second, in addition to understanding the dynamics within a market, like barriers to entry and market power, we also need to look at relationships between markets.  This is especially important because today’s digital platforms frequently operate across multiple areas.  
    A dominant firm may seek to leverage its monopoly power in one market to gain an unfair advantage in another.  In the Microsoft case, for example, a key concern was that Microsoft was abusing its dominant position in operating systems to foreclose competition in browsers. 
    The relationships between markets can be even more complex in the digital age, with the emergence of new business models and an increasingly important role of data.  Law enforcers need to better understand how consumer data is collected, used, and shared within a firm and with third parties.  Such antitrust inquiries generally require a broader perspective and deeper understanding of how each of these markets function.
    Third, taking a broader perspective is particularly important in the context of “free” online services.  Digital platforms are not charities.  When they offer services to consumers for “free,” that just means they are making money somewhere else, either through a different product, from different consumers, or at a different point in time. 
    The increasing prevalence and complexity of “free” digital services may require a broader perspective.
    For example, antitrust enforcers may need to look beyond the free service to better understand a firm’s monetization strategy and incentives.  Enforcers also may need to look more closely at non-price effects.  Fortunately, the long-standing consumer welfare standard enables us to analyze non-price effects on competition, including on quality, innovation, and consumer choice. 
    A broader perspective also requires looking beyond antitrust.  As we listen to complaints from the public, industry, and experts, it has become clear that not every problem related to online platforms comes within the reach of antitrust law. 
    Some have therefore proposed expanding the antitrust laws to reach other non-economic harms.  Drastically re-inventing the antitrust laws, however, is neither easy nor advisable.  The Sherman Act has been around for over a century and has proved flexible enough to adapt to a wide variety of industries, including digital platforms.  We are open to considering new tools and targeted modifications, but a wholesale departure from the antitrust laws’ focus on competition is unwarranted.
    While we should not distort the antitrust laws, the Department of Justice also cannot ignore real harms to the American people.  Where there are non-competition harms, the Department will consider whether there are other tools – including other legal or policy frameworks – that can help.  We are thinking critically about how the Department, and our state and federal partners, can address other topics related to online platforms, such as privacy, transparency, consumer fraud, child exploitation, or public safety.
    One example of a non-antitrust issue related to online platforms is Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.  Generally speaking, Section 230 provides immunity to interactive computer services for third-party content on their platforms. 
    As this group well knows, there is currently a robust public debate over Section 230.  The NAAG sent a letter to Congress last May, proposing an amendment that would carve out U.S. state and territorial criminal law from the current scope of Section 230 immunity.  We, too, are studying Section 230 and its scope. 
    The CDA was passed in 1996 in response to concerns about protecting children from sexually explicit content on the internet.  Section 230 was enacted primarily for two purposes.
    The primary purpose of the amendment was to encourage platforms to self-regulate by granting immunity for blocking or filtering offensive material.  In particular, the amendment aimed to overrule a 1995 state court decision that treated an online message board as a publisher of third-party content, and thus liable for defamation, because the service restricted access to some, but not other, objectionable material.
    Another purpose was to encourage the growth of online forums by immunizing platforms against liability for third party speech.  Section 230 was passed at a time where the internet was relatively new, and Congress wanted to protect the growth of online services and the ability for the internet to offer “a forum for true diversity of political discourse.” 
    Section 230 has been interpreted quite broadly by the courts.  Today, many are concerned that Section 230 immunity has been extended far beyond what Congress originally intended.  Ironically, Section 230 has enabled platforms to absolve themselves completely of responsibility for policing their platforms, while blocking or removing third-party speech – including political speech – selectively, and with impunity. 
    Some also question whether such a broad immunity is still necessary to protect online companies.  Indeed, ten years ago, a Ninth Circuit opinion denying Section 230 immunity in part remarked: “The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of communication that could easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses.”  Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n. 15 (9th Cir. 2008).  In other words, the opinion stated:  “the Internet has outgrown its swaddling clothes and no longer needs to be so gently coddled.”  Id. at 1175, n. 39.
    The staggering breadth of Section 230 immunity, as construed by the courts, is evident in a recent Second Circuit opinion involving the Anti-Terrorism Act.  See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2nd Cir. 2019).  There, the court held that Facebook was immune under Section 230 for allegedly matching and facilitating communications between members of the terrorist group Hamas.  The court denied plaintiff’s argument that Facebook’s algorithms and friend-matching service rendered it a “non-publisher” outside the scope of Section 230.  Id. at 66.
    Chief Judge Katzmann dissented in part, criticizing the virtually limitless scope of Section 230 immunity imposed by some courts.  He argued that providing immunity for the steps Facebook took to connect alleged terrorists through algorithm and friend suggestions was far removed from the original purpose of the CDA to protect children against obscene material online.  He called for Congress to revisit the CDA to “better calibrate the circumstances where such immunization is appropriate and inappropriate in light of congressional purposes.”  Id. at 77.
    Chief Judge Katzmann is not alone in his calls for reform.  Section 230 has garnered significant attention from experts, consumer groups, and legislators.  Within DOJ, we also have started thinking critically this issue. 
    The purpose of Section 230 was to protect the “good Samaritan” interactive computer service that takes affirmative steps to police its own platform for unlawful or harmful content.  Granting broad immunity to platforms that take no efforts to mitigate unlawful behavior or, worse, that purposefully blind themselves — and law enforcers — to illegal conduct occurring on, or facilitated by, the online spaces they create, is not consistent with that purpose. 
    We want to engage further with experts, industry, and other government actors, including the NAAG, through informal discussions as well as a public workshop.
    III. Coordination is Key
    As we look at Section 230, antitrust, and other issues raised by the online platforms, it is important to take a coordinated approach. 
    The issues raised by online platforms are interrelated, and we sometimes must weigh competing interests in forming positions related to the digital economy. 
    Privacy is a good example.  Overbroad and overly burdensome privacy legislation could inhibit competition by entrenching monopolists with the resources to comply, while thwarting newer entrants who do not have those resources.
    A single-minded focus on privacy, above all other values, also can impose significant costs, including costs to public safety.  I have, for example, spoken before about the dangers of warrant-proof encryption.  I won’t repeat myself here, but would simply reiterate that technological innovations that purport to protect privacy at all costs – while impeding sworn law enforcers’ ability to go after violent criminals, child predators, human traffickers, and terrorists, even once the enforcers satisfied the rigorous privacy protections built into the Fourth Amendment — may not be worth the trade-off.
    High level coordination in our review of market-leading online platforms also helps avoid imposing conflicting obligations or inconsistent policy positions.  This requires coordination both within and outside DOJ. 
    While we have some of the best and brightest at the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and across the Department working on these issues, we benefit from the perspective and support of our State AG, federal, and international partners.  We are also welcoming consumers, businesses, experts, and others to talk and work with us to address the challenges of the digital age.
    ***
    The technology industry in America has brought great innovations to consumers in the US and around the world.  We must continue to encourage and incentivize innovation and economic growth.  This means not unfairly punishing innovators that have earned their success on the merits.  But it also means making sure markets are competitive and open to the next wave of technological change. 
    As law enforcers, we also must keep up with technological advancements to best protect our citizens.  This is why we have made the review of market-leading online platforms a top priority of the Department. 
    The State AG community plays a very important role in this endeavor.  On behalf of DOJ, I thank you all for your valuable partnership and look forward to our continued work together on this and many other initiatives.

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    Saturday, October 19, 2019

    JUDICIARY: Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 3: The Role of Data and Privacy in Competition - Bioethics In Modern Day Human Trafficking

    Iceland has a generational genetic repository.

    Penn State University seems to run the bioethics portion of modern day human trafficking in support of Iceland's commercialization of really, really, tiny humans, like genomes for genomic predictive modeling crap.

    Wayne State University has the blood bank.

    University of Michigan has the library system of predictive modeling crap.

    Michigan State University looks to be the keyman for all the human lab rat experiments.

    WHO definitions of genetics and genomics
     Genetics is the study of heredity.1 Genomics is defined as the study of genes and their functions, and related techniques. 1,2 The main difference between genomics and genetics is that genetics scrutinizes the functioning and composition of the single gene where as genomics addresses all genes and their inter relationships in order to identify their combined influence on the growth and development of the organism.

    Bioethics is just another reengineered component when it comes to the residuals of the peculiar institution, which is what shall eventually aid in the obviation of policy and law, specifically in the areas of procurement for inurement.

    deCODE genetics
    https://www.decode.com/
    https://cofs.lara.state.mi.us/CorpWeb/CorpSearch/CorpSummary.aspx?ID=801050160&SEARCH_TYPE=3




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    Monday, September 16, 2019

    DOJ: Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Delivers Remarks at 46th Annual Fordham Competition Law Institute Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy


    New York, NY  ~ Thursday, September 12, 2019
    “With a Little Help from My Friends”:  Using Principles of Comity to Protect International Antitrust Achievements
    It is an honor to be here again at this great event.  I always enjoy coming to Fordham and seeing so many friends, colleagues, and familiar faces.
    Those of you who heard me speak last year may have picked up on the fact that I enjoy history.  As one of my predecessors, former AAG Wendell Berge, commented, “[i]t is valuable to revisit the past . . . because we can acquire some insight into what might happen in the future.”  With that in mind, I’d like to spend my time with you today discussing where we’ve come from in the field of international antitrust.  Then I’d like to focus on how we can protect against losing the progress that we’ve made, and work towards strengthening our bonds in furtherance of our mutual goals of free and competitive markets. 
    The Division has long advocated for the market, not the government, to decide winners and losers.  Our role is to protect the conditions under which competition can thrive to the benefit of consumers.  As my friend and then-AAG John Shenefield remarked in the 1970s, “[e]conomic regulation has been a failure in U.S. domestic markets; it is one of the few things we should not try to export.”  We’ve made significant progress at harmonizing international antitrust practices and minimizing conflict over this view.  This progress did not come without sustained international effort, including from many in this room. 
    Let’s start by going back to a time when antitrust was the least of the international community’s concerns.  As I was preparing today’s remarks, I read a speech given by former AAG Berge in 1945.  Its opening line was “We are approaching the time when Japan will join Germany in unconditional surrender.  This climax of a war which has absorbed so completely the lives and energies of millions of people will mark the beginning of a new phase in modern history.”
    Almost 75 years later, that’s still about as attention-grabbing of an introduction as I’ve seen in an antitrust speech.  It also communicates the optimism of the time that the world had turned a corner and could start building something new.  Unsurprisingly, World War II caused a sea-change in the way that the United States viewed the global community.  Isolationism was not just an increasingly difficult task.  It was dangerous.  As a result, international issues more and more came to the forefront of the Antitrust Division’s thinking.  Antitrust had an important role to play in making sure that we did not replace military conflict with economic conflict. 
    Cartels were central in the Division’s crosshairs.  While the goal of eliminating cartels sounds uncontroversial today, it was not widely shared at the time.  Many countries credited industrial cooperation and organization with pulling them out of the depression.  Rather than disbanding cartels in favor of competition, these countries tried to prevent abuse by imposing bureaucratic review of pricing and other practices.  Even when there was abuse, these jurisdictions frequently turned a blind eye if it benefitted firms within their own country.
    By making it the stated policy of the Antitrust Division to open up global economic markets, the United States was bound to come into conflict with other countries.  Many countries did not yet have competition laws.  Some prioritized protectionism over competition.  Others objected to the United States’ attempts to apply its laws to conduct occurring outside of the United States’ borders. 
    What followed was a period of international antitrust characterized by conflict of laws.  The United States sought active extraterritorial enforcement of its antitrust laws.  In response, other countries adopted so-called “blocking statutes” that prevented access to the evidence necessary for a successful prosecution.  This conflict did not just prevent the Division from achieving its goal of eliminating cartels.  It also required American businesses—which were still subject to U.S. antitrust laws—to compete on an uneven playing field.  Finding that our efforts were creating the very conflict we were trying to avoid, the Division set out to take a different tack.
    Following World War II, the United States had become heavily involved in multilateral organizations.  In the 1950s, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation provided one of the first opportunities for the U.S. to exchange its views on competition issues.  It sponsored a group of experts in their work on restrictive business practices, and published a guide on competition laws around the world.
    The Organization for European Economic Cooperation eventually became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or the OECD.  In 1961, the OECD established the first predecessor to the Competition Committee that exists today.  This Committee was a high priority for the United States.  AAG Lee Loevinger attended its first meeting in December 1961, and then-Attorney General Robert Kennedy enthusiastically supported the Division’s participation.    
    The commitment to come together and discuss antitrust issues started to bear fruit.  As early as 1967, the OECD’s Competition Committee produced a recommendation on international cooperation in competition enforcement.  A central feature of that recommendation was the requirement that agencies notify each other of investigations that might affect each other’s territory or interests.  This was largely a defensive interest; a way of protecting one’s businesses from the extraterritorial reach of foreign enforcers.  But this recommendation proved to be an important stepping stone.  Over a series of five revisions, the notification provision has continuously shrunk, as cooperation, coordination, and investigative assistance provisions have expanded.
    Today, communication and cooperation are a given in the international antitrust community.  In 2001, top antitrust officials from 14 jurisdictions, including the U.S. Department of Justice, established the International Competition Network, or ICN.  ICN now includes more than 140 member agencies.  International cooperation is a top agenda item for each of the ICN’s working groups.  It is also a top priority for the Intergovernmental Group of Experts of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.  At its meeting in July this year, that group agreed on a set of guiding policies and procedures for facilitating cooperation among UN member agencies.  These polices are set to be adopted next year at the UN’s Eighth Conference to Review the UN antitrust rules.
    This commitment to international engagement reflects our belief that when foreign governments understand what we do and why we do it, their concerns substantially diminish.  These multilateral organizations were not formed to pursue any specific policy goal.  Instead, they were founded on the premise that regular conversations can identify the best answers.  This approach has deep roots in American ideals, particularly in our First Amendment.  As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, the “only test of truth is its ability to get itself accepted in the marketplace of ideas.”  Just as the truth will emerge from an open and transparent discussion of ideas, our hope and experience has been that a robust vetting of competition policies will produce the best practices. 
    Having opened an international dialogue, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ was able to begin working with the international competition community to converge our substantive competition rules.  This was a longstanding and important goal.  Former AAG Rule noted back in the 1980s that “[i]n a one-world economy, conflicting competition regimes threaten to create a regulatory ‘Tower of Bab[el].’”  These international conflicts were not just inconveniences.  They deprived consumers of efficiency-enhancing mergers.  As then-AAG Rule explained, “[t]he complexity of dealing with so many overlapping but at times inconsistent rules and regulations will surely make some otherwise worthwhile economic transactions prohibitively expensive.”
    One of our most important and productive steps forward came during the tenure of AAG Jim Rill.  He initiated our serious substantive engagement with new antitrust enforcers after the fall of the Iron Curtain.  Working with our colleagues at the FTC, he established technical assistance programs in countries that were transitioning to a market-based system.  Under these programs, the United States offered technical advice on the role that antitrust law could play in protecting competition in newly opened markets.  These technical assistance programs continue to this day.  The Antitrust Division regularly sends lawyers and economists to antitrust agencies around the world to share our learnings from decades of experience.  All of this is done to further the goal set by then-AAG Rill in 1991:  “[I]n an increasingly transnational business environment, the rules of the game should be as consistent as possible from place to place.”
    Our continued engagement led to progress.  By 2004, then-AAG Hew Pate noted that “[t]he search for objective, non-political principles for competition law has meant that over the last few decades antitrust has become increasingly about economics.”  This statement highlights a few key aspects of effective rules for antitrust enforcement.  If we want to approach international consensus on antitrust issues, the rules must be objective, and they cannot be political.   
    This is an important lesson to remember in light of suggestions that we incorporate other areas of law or general issues of social welfare into our antitrust analysis.  With global businesses and near-global antitrust enforcement, consistency is important.  We cannot expect that all countries or political parties will share the same view of a desired social outcome or agree on all substantive areas of law that might interact with the antitrust laws.  We can, however, limit the inconsistency when the touchstone of our antitrust analysis is fundamental principles of economics. 
    As we converged on a common substantive approach, we opened new opportunities to work together.  Over the past 25 years, it has become increasingly common for the Antitrust Division to coordinate closely with international enforcers.  This cooperation benefits the enforcement agencies, the business community, and consumers, as we are able to share views of the evidence, expected timelines, and evaluations of potential remedies. 
    As just one example, the Antitrust Division recently investigated the Thales/Gemalto merger, which involved components used in complex encryption systems.  After completing its review, the Division decided that a divestiture was necessary to remedy the harms that would otherwise flow from that merger.  Because the Division had worked closely with the EC throughout its investigation, we understood that the EC shared many of our concerns, and would also likely require a divestiture.  Thales and Gemalto both had multinational customers and distributed their products globally.  Splitting the divestiture so that there was one buyer in America and a separate buyer in Europe would have made it more difficult for the divestiture buyers to compete.  Recognizing the importance of finding a single purchaser, we at the Division decided to depart from our normal practice of requiring an up-front buyer.  We were able to use the extra time to work with the parties and the EC to find a single purchaser that was acceptable to everyone.  Our close cooperation made it possible to align on timing, provide more effective antitrust enforcement, and fully protect American consumers. 
    Cooperation in our cartel matters also remains of critical importance, particularly on leniency issues.  The modern version of the Division’s leniency policy has been in place for over 25 years.  The idea is simple:  it is easier to uncover and prosecute international cartels if participants have real incentives to self-report.  While the language of the leniency policy has not changed since the 1990s, we have continuously evaluated the program to ensure that incentives remain in place to encourage self-reporting.  To that end, in 2004, the U.S. Congress added incentives to self-report in ACPERA—the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act—by reducing civil damages exposure for companies that successfully apply for leniency and cooperate with civil claimants. 
    In the 25 years of our current leniency policy and 15 years of ACPERA, the Division has learned that leniency programs thrive when they are predictable and transparent.  As the number of countries around the world that investigate and prosecute cartels has increased, the Division has worked to share these lessons with the international enforcement community.  If one country’s leniency program is unpredictable and lacks transparency, it could undermine our collective efforts at prosecuting international cartels.  Similarly, if cooperating with multiple countries becomes too difficult or expensive, we risk unnecessarily deterring self-reporting and cooperation. 
    All of this means that our work isn’t done.  We should continue our efforts, with a renewed focus on cartel issues.  We should ensure that leniency applicants can meet the competing demands of all jurisdictions where they have exposure.  For example, we have found that small steps, such as coordinating witness interviews and focusing our investigations on the harms within our respective jurisdictions, can have a large impact on the costs of self-reporting.  We are developing our own internal best practices at the Division, and engaging in a constructive dialogue on this topic with our enforcement counterparts.  An important forum for this dialogue is the ICN Cartel Working Group, which currently is developing ways to enhance coordination on leniency matters.  This project will provide practical guidance on best practices for cross-border leniency coordination, with the goal of making enforcement more effective and efficient.      
    Coordination and cooperation, however, is only the first step.  Ensuring a set of due process rights and agreeing on a set of basic procedures can be just as important. 
    Agreement within the competition community on antitrust process has been easy on some fronts.  For example, merger notification and review procedures were one of the first subjects discussed among the ICN members.  ICN has also adopted recommended practices for transparency, engagement, and confidentiality during the investigative process.  Similarly, OECD has been a productive forum for discussions.  Then-AAG Varney presided over a series of roundtables just a decade ago when she chaired OECD’s Competition Committee Working Party 3.  These roundtables helped pave the way for our more recent efforts.
    When I became AAG, I made it a priority for the Antitrust Division to take these discussions to the next level.  To that end, the Division led an initiative for the first-of-its-kind multilateral agreement on due process that turned into the ICN’s Framework for Competition Agency Procedures, or the “CAP.”  The CAP sets forth a series of fundamental due process norms such as non-discrimination; transparency and predictability; timely notice and resolution; avoidance of conflicts of interest; right of defense; and right to counsel and privilege protections.  As the Head of the International Relations Unit for DG Comp recently described it, the CAP creates a “fundamental counterbalance” for parties appearing before antitrust enforcers. I was very pleased that the CAP opened in Cartagena, Colombia in May with more than 60 original signatures.  As of today, over 70 countries have signed on.  This agreement will make us more efficient and effective competition law enforcers, and will continue to build confidence in our enforcement actions.
    The CAP also builds upon our learnings from other areas of international cooperation.  It includes a series of review and consultation mechanisms that will continue and even deepen the dialogue between us.  Our colleagues in Europe recently encouraged companies to raise any violation of the CAP with their domestic enforcement agency, which can then address the issue directly in bilateral conversations.  I join in that encouragement, and hope that companies that experience due process violations abroad will bring those issues to the Antitrust Division, so that we can take appropriate action.
    Of course, our hope is that CAP fosters a positive dialogue as well.  Competition agencies around the world operate in different legal and political systems.  The mechanics of antitrust enforcement in a common law or prosecutorial system differ from enforcement in a civil law context where there are specialized tribunals.  The CAP requires that signatories publicize templates summarizing national procedures and practices.  This transparency will allow the Division to understand more readily a specific jurisdiction’s policies, and will help us evaluate our ability to cooperate with that country on an investigation.  My hope is that the CAP will help create a feedback loop where procedural transparency and convergence creates opportunities for additional case cooperation and further substantive convergence as well. 
    The CAP is still in its early stage, but I have been greatly encouraged by the international reception of the agreement.  It has the potential to become one of the competition community’s most significant achievements in promoting due process.  Still, we hear complaints that there are agencies that use the competition process to forward blatantly national goals.  These complaints center on issues during the investigative process.  We have more work to do.  It is my hope that every major trading partner with a competition enforcer joins in efforts to improve procedural due process moving forward.
    Now that we’ve taken this whirlwind tour of international antitrust history, it’s time to ask what’s next.  Business continues to become more global, and additional countries continue to develop and ramp up their antitrust enforcement.  Each of these factors makes international cooperation in enforcement a matter of increasing importance.  As then-AAG Pate noted 15 years ago, “[a] global antitrust system in which each agency simply lines up to take its whack at the piñata is not a model that is going to serve us, or the market, very well.”  He described the danger of such an approach when he noted that “an international system of seriatim review of controversial matters by different authorities that enables opponents of a transaction to skip across the globe until they get an answer that they like is unacceptable.”  A few years before these comments, then-Acting AAG Doug Melamed similarly highlighted that a failure to work together with our international counterparts “risks not only needless burdens on businesses and suboptimal antitrust enforcement, but also the international politicization of antitrust disputes.”
    This is a particular concern with intellectual property, where decisions made in one country can set the norm for global operations.  The most obvious example of this phenomenon may come from outside the antitrust arena.  In May of 2018, the European General Data Protection Regulation went into effect.  This law required, among other things, that companies disclose if they use cookies on their websites.  Despite no such law in the United States, we now constantly see such notifications appearing when we access the web as well.  While this example seems likely to be benign, others are not.  For instance, we have seen countries require global licensing of U.S. patents as a remedy.  Such decisions have the real potential to decrease incentives to invest and to innovate.  When a foreign enforcer imposes such a remedy globally, it takes away the Antitrust Division’s ability to reach a different conclusion and risks harming American consumers.  It also takes away the ability of every other jurisdiction to reach a different conclusion.
    So, what is the solution?  I think it is time to return to a topic that then-AAG Rill popularized for the antitrust community in the early 1990s:  comity.  Comity promotes efficiency for international businesses by avoiding unnecessary conflicts.  For example, the Division has been clear that we will not seek world-wide relief where a narrower scope proves adequate.  Our role is to protect competition for American consumers, workers, and entrepreneurs.  It is not to play international antitrust cop where U.S. commerce is not affected.  Consumers and businesses alike are best served when countries avoid using the antitrust laws to expand their sphere of influence.  As our Supreme Court explained in Empagran, principles of comity do not permit “legal imperialism” when a country’s “antitrust policies could not win their own way in the international marketplace for . . . ideas.”
    Circuit Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg, a former AAG of the Antitrust Division, recently co-wrote an excellent article on the dangers of overly broad relief, titled “The Enduring Vitality of Comity in a Globalized World.”  I encourage you all to read it, if you haven’t.  As he explains, “comity requires more than avoidance of conflicting outcomes and remedies; it also requires respect for differences in the scope and commercial effect of the laws of foreign sovereigns.”  Judge Ginsburg persuasively argues that comity is necessary if we do not want to create a race to the bottom where antitrust becomes a tool for industrial policy.  In other words, comity is a necessary principle to consider and apply if we do not want to undo all of our hard work over the last 75 years.
    It is important to emphasize, however, that employing principles of comity does not mean that we are tying our hands.  As our Supreme Court explained more than a century ago, “‘[c]omity’ . . . is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other.”  Our Supreme Court reiterated that comity is not an all-encompassing obligation in Hartford Fire.  That opinion accepted that comity had a role to play when thinking about the Sherman Act’s application to foreign conduct, but it limited comity’s role to situations where it was truly necessary to resolve a conflict.  Most recently, in the Vitamin C case, the Supreme Court just last year unanimously rejected the view that comity required deference to foreign interpretation, again emphasizing the flexible nature of the comity inquiry.  As the opinion notes, “a federal court is neither bound to adopt the foreign government’s characterization nor required to ignore other relevant materials.  No single formula or rule will fit all cases . . . .”
    The Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation make clear our ongoing commitment to applying principles of comity to our own decision making.  We need to ensure, however, that comity is a two-way street.  We cannot agree to subject American companies to unfair treatment under foreign laws in the name of comity and avoidance of conflict. 
    Any application of comity has to take into account the particular enforcer, including any history of discrimination in favor of its own domestic companies or against foreign companies.  We will not defer our own investigation unless we are certain that our foreign counterparts will conduct a full and fair investigation of their own. 
    With these principles in mind, I have directed the Division to undertake a review of our International Guidelines.  We will make sure that these Guidelines:  (1) first, accurately reflect the latest guidance from our Supreme Court and lower courts; (2) second, adequately reflect the importance of comity to our relationships with international competition enforcers; and (3) third, adequately convey the symmetry that we expect from our international counterparts.  In doing so, we hope to further strengthen our invaluable relationships with our international colleagues, as we all pursue the common goal of protecting competition.
    I want to again express my appreciation for the invitation to speak today.  International antitrust issues remain vitally important to the work that we do at the Antitrust Division.  I commend this event for drawing attention to these topics and providing the opportunity to engage in a dialogue regarding these issues.  Thank you.   

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