Showing posts with label MERS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MERS. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 3, 2019

SCOTUS Justices, Other Elected Officials, MERS & International Money Laundering Of Mortgage Fraud - Just Another Case For Impeachment

Well, I bet this is awkward for SCOTUS.

In this second supplement to SCOTUS Certiorari Petition No. 18-7752, the Petitioner - Mohan A. Harihar identifies several NEW discoveries, including: (1) Mortgage Fraud Audits conducted on properties owned by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), US Attorney Andrew Lelling (MA) & Middlesex Superior Court Judge Kenneth Fishman; (2) Contradicting Testimony from WELLS FARGO CEO (former) Tim Sloan; & (3) New FOIA request filed with the Office of the Attorney General

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Saturday, April 13, 2019

Cocktails & Popcorn: Dan Gilbert Forgot About Amrock Defending Quicken Loans Junk Bond Rating

What about Amrock?

You forgot about Amrock, Dan.

Dan Gilbert defends Quicken Loans over 'junk' bond rating


Quicken Loans Technology Center
in Corktown
Detroit-based Quicken Loans is enjoying strong profits and holds the title as the nation's No. 1 direct-to-consumer mortgage lender.

It is one of the city's largest employers and the biggest revenue-generator in the business empire of Dan Gilbert, the central figure in downtown Detroit's recent and dramatic turnaround.

Yet in the eyes of the Wall Street credit rating agencies, Quicken Loans is still viewed as a relatively risky business and its debt is rated as below investment grade, or what is commonly called "junk" in the financial world. It's considered too dangerous for some investors such as some pension funds.

For the rating agencies, a fundamental issue is not how well Quicken is managed, but rather the nature of its business as a non-bank mortgage lender that is reliant on short-term financing — and without any bank deposits to fall back on.

During last decade's mortgage market meltdown and financial crisis, several similar lenders collapsed when their short-term borrowing arrangements dried up.

No one contends that Quicken Loans is facing any immediate danger of a cash crunch, but the rating agencies' cautionary assessment raises questions about the long-term stability of the mortgage lender's business model — as well as downtown Detroit's continued resurgence, which has relied on Gilbert's ability to finance big real estate investments.



Gilbert's real estate firm, Bedrock, owns or controls about 100 properties in greater downtown Detroit and has undertaken expensive renovations of many of them. Among other projects, the firm is building what would be the tallest skyscraper in Detroit, surpassing the Renaissance Center in height.

”If you took Dan Gilbert’s enterprises out of the equation, Detroit's downtown would be basically crawling along in rebuilding itself," said John Mogk, a Wayne State University law professor who specializes in urban development. "So If you begin to let the air out of that balloon, then everything begins to collapse.”

Two of the "Big Three" credit rating agencies have assigned junk ratings to Quicken Loans. The most recent action, in January by agency Moody's Investors Service, scored Quicken as a stable "Ba1," which is a notch below investment grade on Moody's scale.


The other agency, S&P Global Ratings, last affirmed Quicken as "BB" in 2017, or two notches below investment grade on that agency's scale. The third big rating agency, Fitch Ratings, hasn't done any in-depth scores on the company.

Gilbert defends

In a phone interview this week, Gilbert pushed back on any notion that Quicken Loans is a true credit risk.

"Our balance sheet and our liquidity is the most solid and strongest it's been since we started 34 years ago," he said Monday.

Gilbert noted how the junk category has a wide range of gradations and includes companies such as Netflix and Detroit-based Ally Financial, General Motors' former finance arm GMAC. Simply landing in junk territory doesn't mean that a company is in trouble and forced to accept exorbitant borrowing costs, he said.

Quicken had a junk rating when it did a $1 billion, 10-year bond issue in December 2017 with a 5.25% fixed interest rate.

“If you’re familiar with what people people call junk yields, (5.25%) is nowhere near that kind of thing," Gilbert said. "You see companies who are at the worst end of it getting interest rates over 12% and the companies that are at the highest notch of what you're calling junk are getting 4 or 5% interest rates."

Gilbert also emphasized how Moody's scorecard gave 65% weight to Quicken's "operating environment" in the mortgage business and only 35% to the company's balance sheet.
"What brings us down is the industry we're in," he said.

Higher risk

Credit rating agencies are tasked with evaluating the financial health of companies and governments and the riskiness of specific bonds and securities.

Companies with junk ratings typically must pay higher interest rates to borrow money than those with investment-grade ratings. That premium reflects the added risk that investors take when lending to such firms, said Sudip Datta, finance department chair at Wayne State University's Mike Ilitch School of Business.

Some investors like junk bonds because they want the higher yield.

"The rating tells investors that this is a junk-bond category, so be careful, but if you want to have higher returns, take the risk," Datta said.

Many pension funds and money market funds are not allowed to buy junk bonds.

Credit rating agencies appear to be more conservative these day when rating non-bank mortgage lenders than they were before the 2007-09 financial crisis and recession.

For example, Moody's still gave Countrywide Financial an investment-grade rating — albeit a low one — in November 2007, shortly before the mortgage giant's dramatic collapse and acquisition at a fire sale price by Bank of America the following year.

Today, Quicken Loans has a Moody's rating that is one notch below where Countrywide was in those calamitous final months.

A Moody's representative last week declined to comment on whether the agency has adjusted its rating standards for mortgage lenders since the financial crisis.

The government's official Financial Crisis Inquiry Report called the big three credit rating agencies "key enablers of the financial meltdown" for giving top ratings to mortgage-backed securities that were in actuality very risky.

"There's probably a lot of shell-shocked rating firms," Gilbert said. "If you look at the ratings of securitizations from 10, 11 years ago, you'll see a lot of investment-grade stuff that didn't turn out too well for people."

'Strengthen our liquidity'

Quicken's bonds have always been rated in junk territory. The company scored a notch below its current Moody's rating in 2015, when it issued $1.25 billion, 10-year bonds at 5.75%. Most of that money flowed to Quicken's parent company, Rock Holdings.

Gilbert said that both of Quicken's bond issues (2015 and 2017) were done to "strengthen our liquidity".

"One of the reasons was the attractive nature of the terms and the interest rate," he said. "The fact we could lock in debt for 5.25% for 10 years without covenants was something we wanted to take advantage of." (Covenants, in this case, refer to restrictions on a borrower's activities or debt levels.)

Inherent risk

In its Quicken Loans analysis, Moody's praised Quicken's "sound balance sheet" and its "conservative financial management."

It said the company's core profitability has decreased from the exceptionally high levels of 2015-16, during the mortgage refinancing boom, although Quicken is expected to stay highly profitable for the next several years.

But offsetting those positives is the inherent risk in Quicken's business model.

Unlike traditional banks that take deposits, Quicken and other non-bank lenders typically borrow money for their mortgages through so-called "warehouse" lines of credit offered by banks and other financial institutions.

Last decade's financial crisis showed how such funding models can, at times, be precarious. Lenders can pull their credit lines or other short-term financing, leaving dry the companies that depended on the money flow.

That disaster scenario happened to several mortgage lenders during the 2007-08 market collapse that had specialized in risky subprime or "Alt-A" loans, such as now-defunct American Home Mortgage and New Century Financial.

Moody's did credit Quicken for having more than 40% of its credit lines in longer term two-year durations. And it positively noted how Quicken recently began funding a small portion of its mortgages — still less than 10% — with cash on its own balance sheet.

A Free Press review of other large non-bank mortgage lenders that compete with Quicken Loans found their credit ratings to also be in junk territory — typically below Quicken's. Some of those firms had to pay interest rates between 8% and 11% in past bond issues.

Separately, the City of Detroit currently has junk ratings from at least two credit rating agencies. Detroit emerged from the nation's largest Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in December 2014. And Moody's downgraded Ford Motor Co. to a notch above junk in August. 

Government-backed loans

Moody's said the vast majority of Quicken's mortgages have explicit government backing through Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Housing Administration or the Department of Veterans Affairs, which insure loans against homeowner defaults.

Quicken pools those mortgages and bundles them into securities, which the company then sells into the secondary market. Quicken uses the money from those sales to pay back the credit line funds.
Moody's said that Quicken holds its mortgages for only a few weeks, which helps to offset risks.

Other risks

The rating agency did mark down Quicken for the long-running Department of Justice lawsuit against the company. That False Claims Act case, first filed in 2015, alleges that Quicken fraudulently approved borrowers for FHA-backed mortgages from 2007 through 2011.

The company has strongly denied the allegations and, unlike other lenders, refused to settle the case with a big payout to the government. Last week, a federal judge in Detroit ordered Quicken and the Justice Department to try one more time to reach a mediated settlement.

Quicken is still the nation's largest FHA lender and, according to Moody's, has among the lowest default rates of all lenders for that type of loan.

Looking ahead, Moody's said that Quicken and other lenders could face challenges in the coming years if interest rates rise and then depress the total volume of mortgage originations.

That scenario might tempt lenders to make dodgier loans to less qualified borrowers. (a.k.a. "The Poors").

"As origination volumes decline, mortgage lenders typically migrate to riskier mortgage origination products to boost origination volumes," Moody's warned in its report.

However, Gilbert told the Free Press that Quicken, which now has a roughly 6 percent market share, would not start giving out dicey mortgages.

"The one company that didn't do those kinds of loans and survived and thrived and became the largest lender in America was Quicken Loans," he said. "So, certainly, we're not going to do that now, after we watched the whole world explode." America' largest lender, Quicken Loans, survived because it was using federal, taxpayer dollars.

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Thursday, August 16, 2018

DOJ: Royal Bank of Scotland Agrees to Pay $4.9 Billion for Financial Crisis-Era Misconduct

Looks like Detroit is going to have a Happy New Year.

It also looks like criminal charges are still in play.

Settlement Is Largest Penalty Imposed On A Single Entity By The Justice Department For Financial Crisis-Era Misconduct

The Justice Department announced today a $4.9 billion settlement with The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc (RBS) resolving federal civil claims that RBS misled investors in the underwriting and issuing of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) between 2005 and 2008. The penalty is the largest imposed by the Justice Department for financial crisis-era misconduct at a single entity under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, which authorizes the federal government to seek civil penalties against financial institutions that violate various predicate criminal offenses, including wire and mail fraud.

“Many Americans suffered lasting economic harm as a result of the 2008 financial crisis,” said Acting Associate Attorney General Jesse Panuccio.  “This settlement holds RBS accountable for serious misconduct that contributed to that financial crisis, and it sends an important message that the Department of Justice will pursue financial institutions that illicitly harm the American economy and our consumers.”

"This resolution – the largest of its kind – holds RBS accountable for defrauding the people and institutions that form the backbone of our investing community,” said Andrew E. Lelling, U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts. “Despite assurances by RBS to its investors, RBS’s deals were backed by mortgage loans with a high risk of default. Our settlement today makes clear that institutions like RBS cannot evade responsibility for the damage caused by their illicit conduct, and it serves as a reminder that the Justice Department, and this Office, will hold those who engage in fraudulent conduct accountable.”

“The actions of RBS resulted in significant losses to investors, including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which purchased the Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities backed by defective loans,” said Associate Inspector General Jennifer Byrne of the Federal Housing Finance Agency-Office of Inspector General’s (FHFA-OIG). “We are proud to have partnered with the U.S Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts on this matter.”

The settlement includes a statement of facts that details – using contemporaneous calls and emails of RBS executives – how RBS routinely made misrepresentations to investors about significant risks it failed to disclose about its RMBS. For example:
  • RBS failed to disclose systemic problems with originators’ loan underwriting. RBS’s reviews of loans backing its RMBS (known as “due diligence”) confirmed that loan originators had failed to follow their own underwriting procedures, and that their procedures were ineffective at preventing risky loans from being made. As a result, RBS routinely found that borrowers for the loans in its RMBS did not have the ability to repay and that appraisals for the properties guaranteeing the loans had materially inflated the property values. RBS never disclosed that these material risks both existed and increased the likelihood that loans in its RMBS would default. 
  • RBS changed due diligence findings without justification. RBS’s due diligence practices did not remove fraudulent and high-risk loans from its RMBS. For example, when RBS’s due diligence vendors graded loans materially defective, RBS frequently directed the vendors to “waive” the defects without justification. One due diligence vendor, which tracked waivers by most major participants in the RMBS industry, concluded that RBS waived material defects 30% more frequently than the industry average. RBS’s waiver of material defects routinely resulted in the securitization of loans with excessive risk. When it engaged in such waivers, RBS never included enhanced “scratch-and-dent” disclosures that would have alerted investors that loans with excessive risks were included in the RMBS.
  • RBS provided investors with inaccurate loan data. RBS’s due diligence frequently found that loan data – which RBS passed on to investors, who used the data to analyze the risks associated with its RMBS – were riddled with errors. Many inaccuracies made the loans look less risky than they actually were. RBS, however, did not require originators to correct the data errors. In one deal, where RBS identified over 600 data errors associated with 563 loans (including debt-to-income ratios understated by as much as 2700%), RBS failed to disclose these errors even to the originator; instead, RBS reassured the originator that RBS had not required originators to correct data errors in the past and did not anticipate doing so for that deal.
  • RBS failed to disclose due diligence and kick-out caps. To develop and maintain business relations with originators, RBS agreed to limit the number of loans it could review (due diligence caps) and/or limit the number of materially defective loans it could remove from a RMBS (kick-out caps). RBS’s scheme reached its height in two deals issued in October 2007. In both of these RMBS, RBS identified hundreds of underlying loans that carried a particularly high risk of default and would cause losses to the RMBS investors. RBS kept these materially risky loans in the RMBS, without disclosing their inclusion to investors, because RBS had agreed to a kick-out cap limiting the number of defective loans that RBS could exclude from the securities in exchange for receiving a lower price for the loan pool. As a result, over the entirety of its scheme, RBS securitized tens of thousands of loans that it determined or suspected were fraudulent or had material problems without disclosing the nature of the loans to investors. 

Through its scheme, RBS earned hundreds of millions of dollars, while simultaneously ensuring that it received repayment of billions of dollars it had lent to originators to fund the faulty loans underlying the RMBS. RBS used RMBS to push the risk of the loans, and tens of billions of dollars in subsequent losses, onto unsuspecting investors across the world, including non-profits, retirement funds, and federally-insured financial institutions. As losses mounted, and after many mortgage lenders who originated those loans had gone out of business, RBS executives showed little regard for this misconduct and made light of it.

These are allegations only, which RBS disputes and does not admit, and there has been no trial or adjudication or judicial finding of any issue of fact or law.

The settlement was the result of a multi-year investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office of the District of Massachusetts.  Assistant U.S. Attorneys Justin D. O’Connell, Brian M. LaMacchia, Elianna J. Nuzum, Steven T. Sharobem, and Sara M. Bloom of Lelling’s Office investigated RBS’s conduct in connection with RMBS, with the support of the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Office of the Inspector General.
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