It is time to address those pesky "attorney-client privileges" and "non-disclosure agreements" in public disclosure law for the historic record.
It is time to seriously revisit the entire doctrine of stare decisis.
Seriously, how is it SCOTUS, or any court for that matter, can sit there and say, "Well, that's what they said back then."
Seriously, how can you go back and even base a court decision on anything that came out of pre-Peculiar Institution Era, or the Civil Rights Act timeframe, or, in this situation, neofuedalism (a.k.a. Privatization) dealing with Public Private Partnerships?
Pay attention, this is one of those neofuedalism "Rehnquist Court" decisions.
The attorney-client privilege, in these situations, are based upon a private attorney, not one who is appointed to represent the United States, meaning an elected official, without advice and consent of the Congress?
Do these attorneys take an oath of office to uphold the constitution or to their profession of being a paying member of a private corporation which controls access to justice, called the American Bar Association?
Do these attorney client privileges prevent an attorney in presenting evidence from its other clients' cases, even if subpoenaed in front of Congress about congressional stuff when they are defending the same clients about congressional fraud stuff?
Just asking.
Something tells me this is already worked out.
Stay tuned and get your popcorn.
What Do Trump & Conyers Have In Common?
Oh, lookie!
A pro se and Ken Starr!
Can you say "Monica Lewinsky?"
Can you say "Whitewater"?
Can you say "Detroit Land Bank Authority"?
Can you say "John Conyers"?
Can you say "Perkins Coie Sucks?"
I can.
SWIDLER & BERLIN et al.v.UNITED STATES
James Hamilton, pro se, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Robert V. Zener.
Brett M. Kavanaugh argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Kenneth W. Starr and Craig S. Lerner.[*]
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Independent Counsel argues that the attorney-client privilege should not prevent disclosure of confidential communications where the client has died and the information is relevant to a criminal proceeding. There is some authority for this position. One state appellate court, Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa. Super. 456, 357 A. 2d 689 (1976), 404*404 and the Court of Appeals below have held the privilege may be subject to posthumous exceptions in certain circumstances. In Cohen, a civil case, the court recognized that the privilege generally survives death, but concluded that it could make an exception where the interest of justice was compelling and the interest of the client in preserving the confidence was insignificant. Id., at 462-464, 357 A. 2d, at 692-693.
But other than these two decisions, cases addressing the existence of the privilege after death—most involving the testamentary exception—uniformly presume the privilege survives, even if they do not so hold. See, e. g., Mayberry v. Indiana, 670 N. E. 2d 1262 (Ind. 1996); Morris v. Cain, 39 La. Ann. 712, 1 So. 797 (1887); People v. Modzelewski, 611 N. Y. S. 2d 22, 203 A. 2d 594 (App. Div. 1994).
Several State Supreme Court decisions expressly hold that the attorney client privilege extends beyond the death of the client, even in the criminal context. See In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 408 Mass. 480, 481-483, 562 N. E. 2d 69, 70 (1990); State v. Doster, 276 S. C. 647, 650-651, 284 S. E. 2d 218, 219 (1981); State v. Macumber, 112 Ariz. 569, 571, 544 P. 2d 1084, 1086 (1976). In John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that survival of the privilege was "the clear implication" of its early pronouncements that communications subject to the privilege could not be disclosed at any time. 408 Mass., at 483, 562 N. E. 2d, at 70. The court further noted that survival of the privilege was "necessarily implied" by cases allowing waiver of the privilege in testamentary disputes. Ibid.
The Independent Counsel (Kavanaugh) argues that the attorney-client privilege should not prevent disclosure of confidential communications where the client has died and the information is relevant to a criminal proceeding. There is some authority for this position. One state appellate court, Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa. Super. 456, 357 A. 2d 689 (1976), 404*404 and the Court of Appeals below have held the privilege may be subject to posthumous exceptions in certain circumstances. In Cohen, a civil case, the court recognized that the privilege generally survives death, but concluded that it could make an exception where the interest of justice was compelling and the interest of the client in preserving the confidence was insignificant. Id., at 462-464, 357 A. 2d, at 692-693.
Mr. Cohen, an attorney, received a monthly retainer, not from the campaign and having nothing to do with the campaign, from which he entered into, through reimbursement, a private contract between two parties, known as a non-disclosure agreement, or NDA. These agreements are.....— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) May 3, 2018
...very common among celebrities and people of wealth. In this case it is in full force and effect and will be used in Arbitration for damages against Ms. Clifford (Daniels). The agreement was used to stop the false and extortionist accusations made by her about an affair,......— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) May 3, 2018
Voting is beautiful, be beautiful ~ vote.©...despite already having signed a detailed letter admitting that there was no affair. Prior to its violation by Ms. Clifford and her attorney, this was a private agreement. Money from the campaign, or campaign contributions, played no roll in this transaction.— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) May 3, 2018
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