December 1999.
MEMORANDUM
J. FREDERICK MOTZ, United States District Judge.
Defendant G. Gordon Liddy has filed a renewed motion to transfer this case to the District of Columbia. The motion will be granted.
This case arises out of allegedly defamatory remarks that Liddy made about plaintiff Ida Maxwell Wells. Liddy has publicly articulated a theory that the Watergate burglary was prompted by a desire to obtain information about a call-girl ring being operated at the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee. According to the theory espoused by Liddy, Maureen Dean, John Dean's wife, is said to have been one of the call girls. Pictures of Maureen Dean and the other call girls allegedly were kept in Wells' desk. Dean allegedly instigated the break-in to recover the photographs.
The Deans filed an action for defamation against Liddy and others in 1992 based upon Liddy's public statements about the call-girl theory and other alleged libels against John Dean. The case was originally instituted in California but was transferred to the District of Columbia upon a motion to transfer filed by Liddy. Wells instituted the present action in 1997. Liddy moved to transfer it to the District of Columbia as well. Initially, I denied the motion. Two factors figured heavily in my decision. First, the Dean case was then dormant and had been for several years. Second, Wells asserted that she "has a very simple case" and that the "case does not depend upon any testimony from the Deans. . . ."
Circumstances have changed since I denied Liddy's original motion to transfer. Wells has now twice named Maureen Dean as a witness despite her prior representation that her case does not depend upon the testimony of the Deans. Although Wells has withdrawn Mrs. Dean's name from the witness list on both occasions, the interrelatedness between this case and at least a portion of the case instituted by the Deans in the District of Columbia has now become apparent. More importantly, the Dean case is no longer dormant. It has been reassigned to Judge Emmett Sullivan who has set a firm trial date of May 5, 2000.
Wells argues that I cannot transfer this case to the District of Columbia because it could not have been instituted there originally, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), since venue and personal jurisdiction over Liddy are lacking in the District of Columbia. This argument is unpersuasive. Liddy has substantial contacts with and engages in a persistent course of conduct in the District of Columbia. Also, the original complaint alleged acts of defamation committed over an Internet website maintained by an organization located in the District and through Liddy's nationwide radio shows. Moreover, prior to Wells bringing suit, Liddy had already purposely availed himself of the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia by initiating the transfer of the Dean litigation. In addition, the federal district judge in California found it was appropriate to transfer the Dean case to the District of Columbia.
I also note that the events underlying the Watergate burglary (in which Liddy was personally involved) occurred in the District of Columbia.
Therefore, this case can be transferred to the District of Columbia. The remaining question is whether it should be transferred. In making this determination I must consider a variety of factors, including the plaintiff's choice of forum, the convenience of counsel and the witnesses, the relative ease of access to sources of proof, and the public interest. See, e.g.,Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947); Dickens v. United States, 862 F. Supp. 91, 92 (D. Md. 1994). The first of these factors obviously weighs against transfer; plaintiff has chosen to bring her action here in Maryland. The second and third factors weigh slightly in favor of transfer since lead counsel for both parties have their offices in the District of Columbia, many of the witnesses live in the District of Columbia area, and none of the witnesses live in the Baltimore area. However, since the District of Columbia and Baltimore are so close to one another, this factor is negligible.
I find the public interest factor dispositive. There is some overlap between this case and the Dean case, and it may be that they should be consolidated. Liddy vigorously argues that they should be; Wells argues just as strongly to the contrary. These conflicting positions essentially boil down to this: Liddy asserts that he should not be subjected to the cost of litigating (and to the risk of inconsistent results) in two different cases that arise, at least in part, from the same nucleus of facts. Wells acknowledges (as she must) that one aspect of the Deans' claims arises, as do her claims, from Liddy's public statements promoting the call-girl theory of the Watergate burglary. She points out, however, that the Deans' claims involve many other issues as well (apparently arising out of Liddy's broad assertions that John Dean committed "massive perjury.") Wells understandably does not wish her discrete claims to be eclipsed or compromised in the shadow of the larger Dean case.
Wells also expresses a concern that her costs of litigation will be much greater if she becomes embroiled in the trial of the Dean case since it is estimated to last longer than her own trial. While this may be true, a countervailing factor is that Wells' counsel is also local counsel for the Deans and will be participating in the trial of the Dean case in any event.
It would seem to be in the interest of the economic use of judicial resources for the two cases to be consolidated if they can justly be tried together. However, in transferring this action to the District of Columbia, I am expressing no view as to whether consolidation is appropriate. I have no jurisdiction over the Dean case and am not sufficiently knowledgeable about the Deans' claims to know whether Wells would be unfairly prejudiced by a single trial. It is clear to me, however, that it is in the public interest to have the case transferred so that Judge Sullivan, who has been actively presiding over the Dean case and has become fully familiar with it, can be given an opportunity to decide whether consolidation would be appropriate. If Judge Sullivan decides in favor of consolidation, the single trial can go forward in May. If, on the other hand, he decides that consolidation is inappropriate, Wells can file a motion to transfer the case back to Maryland, the forum of her original choice, on the ground that the sole reason for my transfer was to allow Judge Sullivan to rule on the consolidation issue.
Of course, it would be up to Judge Sullivan to decide a motion to re-transfer the case to Maryland. However, lest there be any uncertainty on this score, I affirmatively state that I would be fully amenable to having the case transferred back to Maryland in the event Judge Sullivan decides against consolidation. If it were not for the fact that I believe it to be in the public interest for Judge Sullivan to consider the consolidation issue, I would have respected Wells' choice of forum and ruled against the transfer. Moreover, it is against my own sense of responsibility to ask another judge to try a case that is properly before me. To that end, I will hold on my calendar the September 11, 2000 trial date I have set, so that, in the event Judge Sullivan denies consolidation and decides the case should be transferred back to Maryland, he and the parties can be assured that no unnecessary delay will occur.
A separate order effecting the ruling made in this memorandum is being entered herewith.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, it is, this ______ day of December 1999
ORDERED
1. Defendant's renewed motion to transfer is granted; and
2. This case is transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
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